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Abstract. We report results from a study of superannuation member advice-seeking within their 
plan, explaining observed patterns by member age, gender, issue salience, and size-of-bet effect. 
Inquiry mode, frequency and volume of contact with the advice-provider, and sensitivity of members 
to legislative change and macroeconomic events are considered. Results show that gender (female 
more likely than male), age (older rather than younger), balance (larger rather than smaller) and 
experience (longer rather than shorter), are the strongest advice-seeking predictors, consistent over 
time. Findings suggest member engagement around retirement planning may be more effective when 
considering the factors affecting advice-seeking behaviour in general. 
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In Australia, as in many OECD countries, defined contribution (DC) retirement savings schemes 
have come to dominate the flow of supplementary retirement savings. Employers have retreated from 
offering defined benefit (DB) plans variously attributed to unwillingness to accept responsibility for 
making defined benefit promises, higher administrative costs, as well as regulatory (e.g. accounting) 
and economy based (e.g. workforce composition) factors (Turner and Hughes). However, the 
consistent narrative describing the average DC member is either they are disengaged (Butt et al. 2017; 
Commonwealth of Australia 2010, 2014; Productivity Commission 2016) 1  or ill-equipped (e.g. 
Committee for Sustainable Retirement Incomes 2017) to make financial decisions consistent with 
their long-term best interests possibly compounded by a lack of sophistication at the institution.2 
Policy makers also blame consumers (members) for the “absence of consumer competition” 
(Productivity Commission 2016, iv) that results from the asserted disengagement and manifests in 
higher fees. Given this, individuals have been encouraged to be better informed about issues relevant 
to their long-term welfare.3 Some governments have simply bypassed the issue in favour of requiring 
the provision of retirement savings products, primarily defaults, to be consistent with the long-term 
interests of the average plan participant. 
Policy makers have also encouraged retirement savings schemes to take a more active role in 
providing information and, at the limit, advice relevant to their members. However, little is known 
about the take-up of this information and advice; about what issues, when, and in what contexts; and 
to what effect if the advisor or advisors were genuinely disinterested in the outcome. Moreover in any 
event, the average DC plan member may have little interest in expending the time and effort necessary 
to seek advice from informed third parties, as the benefits from a change in behaviour by seeking 
advice may be hard to envisage a priori. 
Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) have observed that DC members could benefit from financial advice given 
their limited financial literacy.  There are, of course, legitimate concerns about the virtues or otherwise of 
financial advisors, especially in circumstances where interests are shrouded or concealed (Gabaix and 
Laibson 2006). In this context, study of participant-initiated advice-seeking4 is intrinsically important 
because understanding its patterns and determinants can shed light on financial behaviour as well as design 
of savings institutions (Clark, Strauss, and Knox-Hayes 2012; Thaler and Sunstein 2008). Our study is also 
important because we are able to elicit patterns and determinants of advice-seeking where the provider is 
motivated to honour participant’s interests as opposed to product providers, such as banks, who distribute 
via incentivised advisers. 
                                                     
1 Commonwealth of Australia (2010, 9) note they do not wish to overstate the issue of disengagement however. 
2 See de Dreu and Bikker (2012). 
3 For example, UK Governments have promoted public awareness programs to cope with the lack of information 
about how and how much to save in different stages of the life cycle.  
4 By ‘advice’ we use a common-sense understanding of the term, signifying a broad range of participants’ 
concerns rather than the particular legal meaning of the term associated with fiduciary duty. 
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We also investigate time patterns of advice-seeking finding that its year-by-year increasing 
volume can be disaggregated into components including a daily effect (within a week) , and a seasonal 
effect (including an end-of-tax-year effect and a summer vacation effect). We highlight a singular, 
noteworthy episode in the volume of advice-seeking across the entire time period: prior to the peak 
in the financial bubble, a major legislative change concerning superannuation benefits announced a 
year before coming into force on July 1, 2007. Notwithstanding the lead-time between announcement 
and legislation effect, we show that advice-seeking was concentrated to the weeks before and, to a 
limited extent, following its implementation. 
We contribute to the existing literature regarding the behavioural drivers of financial decision 
making in general, highlighting gender. Then, by focusing on a singular event, we provide empirical 
evidence on the dynamic process of news salience and individual action. Finally, regarding industry 
practice, we provide evidence of patterns in participants initiated advice seeking beneficial to design 
of effective tailored facilities. Overall, it is demonstrated that age (being older rather than younger), 
gender (being female rather than male), and the size of a person’s account balance (larger rather than 
smaller) are significant predictors of advice-seeking. These findings carry three implications: (i) 
those predisposed to plan for the future by virtue of age benefit most from advice-seeking, (ii) since 
the demand for advice is different by gender, the design and management of the provision of advice 
would seem to be significant issues, and (iii) advice-seeking was concentrated immediately before 
the implementation of the superannuation changes. The timing of release of information (public and 
private) thus merits greater attention. 
 
2. Background 
Decision-making can be characterised according to the nature and frequency of the decision(s) 
taken given the topic or issue. To set the issue in context we present a model of individual behaviour 
underlying the institutional context in which plan participants make decisions and seek advice.  We 
make three assumptions. First, individuals are intendedly rational  (Doherty 2003), i.e. given their 
goals and objectives, they choose what they perceive to be the most effective instruments (means) 
available to realise the ends. 5  Second, making plans depends upon searching for, and sorting 
amongst, the available information concerning options and changing circumstances (Sharpe 2007). 
Third, searching and sorting available information is costly. Given limited cognitive and material 
resources, individuals tend to economise on these tasks. 
Research in the cognitive sciences suggests that the average person has a limited capacity to 
absorb, synthesise, and evaluate large volumes of information. With a never -ending flow of 
information, which adds to ambiguity over the proper course of action rather than resolving 
ambiguity, many people tend to delay taking a decision until they must (Ju and Miao 2012; 
                                                     
5 Intention is emphasized rather than results, matching the argument of Simon (1956) that the latter depend 
also on cognitive constraints and external circumstances (i.e. ‘environment’).  
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O'Donoghue and Rabin 1999). In these circumstances, events that stand out can receive more attention 
than deserved (Barberis 2013). Loss aversion has been suggested as a key factor explaining low 
activity in retirement savings (Fry, Heaney, and McKeown 2007; Hwang and Satchell 2010). 
Together these suggest that the role of advice seeking as a means of reducing the anxiety about risky 
outcomes (Gennaoili, Shleifer, and Vishny 2012) in retirement, including losses, may be influential. 
 
2.1. Logic of decision making 
While retirement planning and saving for the future have long-term consequences, this does not 
necessarily mean that decisions once taken are maintained long-term. Retirement planning has been 
shown to be an issue fraught with uncertainty and depends upon individual and collective 
capabilities and resources (see Clark, Strauss, and Knox-Hayes 2012). Assuming a predisposition 
in favour of saving for the future, its effectiveness depends upon: (1) knowledge and 
understanding of the issues; (2) relevant skills and expertise; and (3) the resources (money, 
networks, and advisory services) required to make informed decisions. Lusardi and Mitchell 
(2007) suggest that financial decision-making in general, and retirement-planning in particular, 
are decisions demanding domain-specific skills and expertise. To the extent individuals recognise 
their shortcomings in this regard, this may dampen their confidence in retirement planning -or 
they may seek advice. 
Hung and Yoong (2010) support the substitutability of financial literacy and advice seeking. 
However, Hackethal, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2011) find that it is wealthier and more 
knowledgeable individuals who seek advice consistent with a complementary advice-seeking and 
financial literacy relationship. Calcagno and Monticone (2015) similarly support 
complementarity claiming ‘advisors are not useful to the investors who need them the most ’, 
depicting a picture of a conflicted advisor who sells products that compromise outcomes for the 
uninformed client. We are more optimistic about the substitutability argument here, given the 
absence of a direct financial incentive for the agent providing advice to members.  
In terms of specific drivers of advice-seeking, Gamble et al. (2015) describe how a change in 
cognitive abilities, typically age-related, affect the decision making process, suggesting that a 
decline in cognition will generally increase the probability of seeking help. It is hypothesised that 
seeking advice is age-related, in that the consequences of making related decisions are more 
transparent and consequential for older members. Younger members tend to heavily discount the 
future, and may simply ignore the issue, in these circumstances. Holding age constant, it is further 
hypothesized that individuals in seeking advice may (in effect) aim to compensate for apparent 
shortcomings in terms of preparedness.  
As a series of financial decisions, in a context of risk and uncertainty, retirement planning is 
also affected by risk (loss) tolerance. Possible responses to apparent risks involved in making 
financial decisions can include exercising caution, delaying making a decision, collecting more 
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information, and seeking advice. Here, though, the evidence seems to suggest that men tend to 
back their judgment whereas women tend to prevaricate (Levin, Snyder, and Chapman 1988). 
Levav and Argo (2010) reveal that women feel more comfortable in engaging with risky decisions 
if a sense of security is evoked by physical contact or listening to a real person rather than using 
advisory services. By contrast, men tend to trust the web for finding relevant information and 
informing decision-making (Riedl, Hubert, and Kenning 2010). The effect of these gender 
differences must, of course, be combined with other observed (e.g. income, wealth) and unobserved 
variables. 
2.2. Institutional setting 
The Australian system requires all employers to make contributions on behalf of their employees 
to a complying superannuation fund with no guaranteed results by either the government or 
employer.  
The compulsory setting necessitates a role of defaults, both in terms of contributions (most often 
the legislative requirement) and investment strategy for those contributions. Empirical evidence 
highlights the significance of defaults given the apparent reluctance of members to make changes 
(Beshears et al. 2009) even through periods of great uncertainty such as the global financial crisis 
(Gerrans 2012). A lack of change does not imply disengagement from retirement savings (Bateman 
et al. 2014) and instead may reflect a underlying trust in the plan’s default choice or recognition of 
a lack of skill by members (Butt et al. 2018). No matter the motive, this behaviour underscores the 
need to “carefully assess what default settings public policy and plan architects should encourage”  
(Dobrescu et al. 2018, 1078).  
The Australian environment is apparently rich in information. The print media, the visual and 
spoken media, and electronic networks are awash with financial information in general and 
retirement matters in particular. This information is uneven in terms of quali ty; but, it is both 
ubiquitous and effectively cost-free. 6  The flow of information is situated in the market for 
information and, as a consequence, is not always trusted because of the (often shrouded) interests 
of commercial providers. In these circumstances, members may seek advice from ‘safe havens’ 
unsullied by the market for information, and with no apparent commercial interest in priming and 
prompting action. We expect that there are peaks and troughs in advice -seeking, along with a 
growing volume of advice-seeking which reflect (in part) the surplus of information in the market 
on retirement savings and the superannuation industry, and the responses of similarly situated 
individuals to this environment. 
3. Data description and model set-up 
A feature of our research lies in the nature of the database analysed which is comprised of 
unsolicited requests for information. 
                                                     
6 Furthermore there are numerous subscription based commercial providers of information tailored to 
topics such as investment strategy, investment options, and the like.  
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3.1. Data Overview—Overall Patterns of Advice Seeking 
Data comes from Mercer (Australia) and their Super Trust, Corporate Division. The Super Trust 
(ST) is the agent for more than 180 private sector employers, large and small, covering 567,451 
individuals across the period 2002–2013. The database has a wide range of individuals, including 
those that earn little over the course of the year through to those that earn very high salaries. It 
represents a significant sample of the Australian economy and society. For each individual, we have 
gender, postcode, date of birth, date joined (left) the company, salary, account balance, employer 
contributions, and voluntary additional savings as described in Feng and Gerrans (2014). 
Mercer’s ST provides a range of services from a common platform. With respect to advice-
seeking, Mercer has two ways of providing advice: a telephone call centre (introduced mid-year 
2004), and a web-based enquiry facility (introduced in early 2008) which is dealt with by call centre 
staff. The telephone helpline is common to all participating employers and their plan participants. 
It is a centralised facility, open weekdays 8am to 7pm. As each call is received, the Mercer adviser 
records the topic or topics raised during the call. Over the period 2004–2013, approximately 70 
categories were used to code the topics. Of the more than 1.5 million topics raised by callers over 
the entire period, 40 of the topic categories received fewer than 1000 statements of interest. In 
general, three groups of categories can be identified (in descending order of significance): 
administrative matters; investment matters; and retirement planning7. 
In Figure 1, call frequency is displayed over the period 2004–2013. From the introduction of the 
call facility in mid-2004, the growth in volume of calls lagged member growth, and it took 
approximately two years for activity to reach a ‘steady-state’, with a peak in the volume of calls mid-
2007 followed by a slight upward shift in calls during 2012. In Section 5.4, we look more closely at 
the circumstances prompting the spike in calls, and identify certain regularities in calling frequency. 
With the closure of the call facility on Saturdays and Sundays, call volume tends to be low on 
Mondays, peaks on Tuesdays, declines on Wednesdays and Thursdays, and dies out on Fridays. In 
terms of monthly frequencies, call volume is highest in June (the Australian tax year concludes June 
30), is lowest in December (including the Christmas and New Year holiday period), gathers 
momentum in March and May of each year, and then tails off once the tax year has passed. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
The upward trend in call volume on a monthly basis was slight, biased by the initial two years in 
which participants became aware of the facility, and the last two years where the call volume began to 
increase. Variance in call volume was dominated by the day-of-the-week (81% of the total variance) 
and seasonal (18.50%) effects. The monthly effect contributed 0.40%, and the week-of-the-year effect 
contributed just 0.12%. 
                                                     
7 When seeking advice, callers (and web-users) often reference a range of issues, some administrative and 
some in terms of investment decision-making. Hard-and-fast distinctions between categories as implied by 
legal definitions of advice do not do justice to the complex interaction between the various concerns that may 
prompt a call. 
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With the introduction of the web enquiry facility mid-2008, there was an immediate surge in web 
requests. Thereafter, volume declined, and in 2013 was at about 60% of the initial interest. While 
the web facility is accessible every day, peaking on Sundays, enquiries are dealt with during weekday 
office hours. Web enquiries peak mid-year and are the lowest over the December/January period.8 
By the end of the period, those that previously used the call facility tended to also use the web 
facility. Those that only used the web were, on average, younger than those that used the web and 
the call facility (36 versus 42 years), had lower salaries ($65,000 versus $80,000 per year), and had 
far lower account balances ($25,000 versus $60,000). On each of these measures, those that used 
only the web facility were more similar to one another than those that used the web and the call 
facility in tandem.  
The period covered by our analysis includes one of the most significant episodes of economic and 
financial turmoil experienced by OECD countries over the past 100 years. It is reasonable to hypothesise 
that over the period 2004–2013, changes in macroeconomic circumstances and changes in consumer 
expectations would have prompted associated changes in the volume of calls.  Upon investigation, no 
such statistical relationship was found.9 
3.2. Data Analysis—Predictors of Call Enquiries 
To answer the question regarding what drives the member to call for advice and assess the 
importance of various predictors of calling behaviour, four mutually exclusive calling groups were 
identified: those who made no calls (Not Called); those who called once (Called Once); those who 
called two to seven times (Called Average); and those who called more than seven times (Called 
Frequently). 
3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
In the complete dataset (n=567,451) 55.8% of members were in the Not Called group. Of the 
44.2% that made a call, 39.1% were in the Called Once group, 52.0% made between two and seven 
calls (hence Called Average), and 8.9% were in the Called Frequently group. On average, there was 
no obvious gender difference between those who called and those who did not. Beyond gender, 
remaining predictor variables change in value over the period and hence a specification of the 
observation is required. The age of a member (Age) was taken as age at entry to the plan. The 
average of annual account balance over the period of membership (Account Balance) was used as 
was the average annual salary (Salary). Finally, the number of years in the plan (Membership) was 
included to ensure we control for opportunity to make a call .10 
                                                     
8 Once the web facility was introduced, younger men rather than younger women took-up this option (as expected). We 
do not know whether the benefits of the call option are framed by the agent and/or the participating sub-plans in ways 
that ‘induce’ more women than men to use it. 
9 Quarterly percentage change in call volume was regressed against quarterly percentage change in: GDP; 
employment; the Australian stock exchange index; and consumer expectations of economic conditions over the next 
five years (all seasonally adjusted). The same estimation using monthly data was also investigated excluding GDP. 
No variables were found significant and the overall F-test was not significant.  Full details are provided in the online 
supplementary file, Table S.1 and Table S.2. 
10 The unconditional correlation between age and membership length is 0.125. 
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A preliminary analysis (see Table 1) showed that on average those in the Called Average group 
relative to the Called Once group were slightly older, had more years of sub-plan membership, and 
had significantly larger account balances and incomes. Those in the Called Frequently group relative 
to those in the Called Once group were significantly older, had much higher incomes and had account 
balances three times those in the Called Once group.  
[Insert Table 1] 
Calling behaviour is associated with consequential retirement savings behaviours. Overall, 19.2 
percent of members made a change to their investment strategy over their membership. However, if a 
member has made a call, the proportion is 24.6 percent whereas for non-callers it is 12.8 percent. The 
same pattern is evident for additional savings behaviour. Overall, 28.1 percent of members choose to 
make additional contributions beyond employer contributions received. Again, if a member made a call 
the proportion is 37.0 percent whereas for non-callers it is 18.8 percent. Whereas the timing and 
frequency of calling behaviour is known, timing of other behaviours is not, hence causality is not able to 
be drawn from these relationships.  
3.4. Model specification 
For our empirical analysis we estimate a multinomial logit using the four groups of calling behaviour as 
specified in equation 1. We obtain J-1 equations providing the predicted probabilities for an individual to 
belong to the correspondent J-1 groups which we estimate simultaneously to obtain the marginal effects 
presented in the next section. 





         (2) 
where b is the benchmark category and x is a vector of predictors previously defined. To capture the 
opportunity to access the web portal, two indicator variables were included. The first reflects whether the 
member had web access available through their membership period (No Web Access) and the second 
reflects whether they had web access and used it (Access, Web User). The omitted category consists of 
those who had access but had not used the web. Additionally, fixed effects were included for member 
location. To explore moderation of effects, Age, Gender, and Account Balance were interacted with one 
another in the estimation. Finally, residuals were allowed to cluster by sub-plan membership. Given 
correlations between the explanatory variables, variance inflation factors (VIF) were estimated. The highest 
VIF of 2.11 for Account Balance suggests multicollinearity is within acceptable limits (Chatterjee, Hadi, 
and Price 2000). 
To ensure a robust set of results, given the amount of heterogeneous information provided by the 
database, we estimate the multinomial logit model twice. The first time participants are grouped according 
to their calling behaviour, thus addressing the probability of not-calling (group 1), calling once (group 2), 
etc. In our second estimation we focus on the means used to seek advice: we comment the model and its 
results in Section 4.2.  
9 
 
We choose to conduct our empirical analysis on the salience of the singular event by estimating a logit 
model, specified in equation 2, addressing the probability of each participant to be a caller during the event 
horizon: 
𝑃𝑟(𝑦 = 1|𝑥) = 𝐺(𝛽0 + 𝑥𝛽1)         (2) 
where x is the vector of predictors as defined above. Results for the singular event analysis are presented 
in Section 5. 
 
4. Multivariate Analysis  
4.1. Calling Behaviour: marginal effects—direction of influence 
Table 2 presents a summary of marginal effects calculated at mean values of remaining variables. 
It is helpful when considering the relative size of these marginal effects to compare the baseline 
predicted probabilities of being in each group reported in the first row for each outcome.  
[Insert Table 2] 
Gender was significant in three of the four groups. Males were more likely (4.7 percentage points) 
to be in the Not Calling group and less likely to be in the Called Once (1.5 percentage points) and 
Called Average (3.0 percentage points) groups. No gender difference was observed for being in the 
Called Frequently group. The marginal effect of Membership had expected signs consistent with an 
‘exposure’ control. That is, those in the fund longest were more likely to be in the Called Average 
and Called Frequently groups and less likely be in the Not Called group. Age was positively 
associated with being in the Called Average or Called Frequently groups and negatively associated 
with being in the Not Called or Called Once groups. However the effect magnitude is small. 
Salary and Account Balance both had a positive association with being in all three calling groups 
and a negative association for the Not Called group. This is consistent with other evidence of non-
default activity by members in a single-sector fund (Dobrescu et al. 2018; Gerrans and Clark 2013). 
However, the magnitudes are small. For example, a one unit change in the Salary increases11 the 
probability of being in the a one-time caller by 1.0 percentage point, an average caller by 3.0 
percentage points, and a frequent caller by 0.5 percentage points. The increase in Salary reduces the 
probability of not calling by 4.4 percentage points. A similar change in Account Balance reduces the 
probability of not calling by 6.6 percentage points, and increases the probability of calling an average 
number of times by 5.4 percentage points. The probability of being in the Called Once group 
increases with Account Balance but the effect is small in magnitude. Considering the overall 
prediction of being a frequent caller (2.0 percent), the marginal effect of 0.7 percentage points was 
relatively large. 
                                                     
11 We note that the analysis allows comment on correlation not causation. 
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Those without web portal access were more likely to call as were those who made use of their 
web portal access, relative to those who had access to the portal but did not utilise it. The probability 
of being in the Not Called group was 30 percentage points lower for those who accessed the fund 
web portal, 4.5 percentage points higher for being in the Called Once group, 22.4 percentage points 
higher for Called Average, and 3.8 percentage points higher for Called Frequently. 
To explore robustness of marginal effects we reclassified calls so that to be classified as a 
separate advice event the call would need to be more than 30 days following a previous call. The 
supplementary file provides estimation results (Table S.3) using the same call categories reported 
in Table 2 but based on the new count. Results are substantively unchanged.  
To investigate the hypothesis that those seeking advice compensate for apparent shortcomings 
such as financial literacy we utilise a proxy, as suggested by Lachance (forthcoming), namely the 
proportion of those in the member’s postcode with university education  (University Education) and 
re-estimate the model. We find that remaining marginal effects are largely unchanged ( refer 
supplementary file Table S.4) though results are contrary to those hypothesised. University 
Education is negatively related to the likelihood of not seeking advice and positively associated 
with seeking advice (calling or web) suggesting rather than a compensatory role of advice-seeking, 
education complements advice seeking. 
The estimation allows investigation of how the marginal effects on the probability of a member 
being in a calling group interact by gender, age and average account balance. Figure 2 highlights 
that the increased likelihood of males not calling was constant by age for those with a lower account 
balance ($50,000; the smallest account balance), declined with age for the smallest account balance, 
and marginally increased for larger account balance. The gender effect was less evident for younger 
members with larger account balances and the gender difference is more homogenous across account 
balances for older members. A significant negative marginal effect for males being in the Calling 
Once category was isolated to those with the lowest account balance, consistent for all but the oldest 
members. In contrast, the negative male marginal effect for the Called Average group was more 
homogenous across the other account balance levels and age levels. The marginal effect of males on 
being in the Called Frequently group was not evident for any age for the lowest account balance 
level. A negative marginal effect emerges for older members and in turn larger for larger account 
balances. 
[Insert Figure 2] 
Figure 3 shows that the marginal effect of age on the probability of being in either calling group 
was not moderated by gender, with the exception of the Called Frequently. Here, the age effect was 
lower for males with the largest account balance, and overall, the impact of age was significantly 
moderated by member account balance. The marginal effect of age on the probability of not calling 
was significantly lower for those with the lowest account balance. It is only those with lower account 
balances that the negative marginal effect of age was significant for the Not Called group. The 
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marginal effect of age on being in the Called Once group was negative for all account balance levels, 
but largest (i.e., most negative) for those with higher account balances. The positive marginal effect 
for age for being in the Called Average group was positive for the two lowest account balance levels 
only. 
[Insert Figure 3] 
The Called Frequently group is notably different in the role of age and size of account balance. 
The marginal effect of age, shown in increases with member account balance and along with evidence 
of variation by gender, was only significant for the larger account balances. Figure 4 confirms this by 
presenting the marginal effect of account balance as larger for older members, moderated by gender 
for those with the largest account balance. A final comment on the Called Frequently group was the 
marginal effect of being a user of the fund web portal. The marginal effect was positive but not as 
strong as for those in the Called Average group which suggests differing roles or motivations. It may 
be that those in the Called Frequently group were seeking, not just information, but a personal link 
through the call. 
[Insert Figure 4] 
4.1.1. Economic magnitude of marginal effects for calling behaviour 
Predicted probabilities were estimated for various combinations of Gender, Age, and Account 
Balance with all else held at mean values. In terms of being in the Not Called group, a 51 percent 
probability is estimated for a 33-year old female member, with a account balance of approximately 
$13,000. By contrast, consider a 50-year old female member with a $100,000 account balance: For 
her, the probability is 31 percent of not calling. The equivalent male has an increased likelihood of 
one to three percentage points in both cases. The same 33-year old, female member with a $13,000 
account balance is estimated to have equal probability for Called Once or Called Average at 24 
percent. The older and larger account balance colleague is distinctly different, with a 19 percent 
chance they would call once against a 42 percent chance they would have called an average number 
of times. In both classifications, the equivalent male is generally three percentage poi nts less likely. 
Finally, the young, low account balance female member has only a one percent probability of being 
a frequent caller against her older and larger account balance colleague, who has a much larger 
probability of seven percent. The male counterpart is similar in each. 
Finally, we also estimated a panel logit estimation of the likelihood of making a call (yes =1) in 
each year of membership (refer supplementary file Table S.5 for details) to complement the 
multinomial logit analysis which relies on behaviour aggregated over membership. Once again 
marginal effects are the same in direction and maintain relative magnitudes among variables. 
4.2. Calling and Web Access Combined 
A multinomial logit regression was also estimated to examine the combination of using the call 
centre and using the fund web portal to answer the question whether the drivers of advice-seeking 
are robust to the means by which the advice is sought or not. Registration is required for those who 
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wish to use the website to make a web-based contact with the agent. The timing or frequency of 
web access is not known and hence four categories combining calling behaviour and web-access 
are identified: those that make no use of either (Not Called, No Web); those who used the call centre 
but not the web (Call, No Web); those who used the web but did not call (Web, Not Called); and 
those who used both the call centre and the web (Call and Web). This allows new insights into 
behavioural interaction with different advice-seeking facilities, potentially enabling the industry to 
design better facilities with better content. 
As noted, the web facility was introduced in 2008 and therefore the empirical analysis was set 
2008 through to 2013. The same set of explanatory variables was included with the exception of 
membership length. Those whose membership totally precedes the web-portal are not included. Of 
remaining members some have a membership period both before and after the web-portal was 
introduced. Others only became members after the web-portal was introduced. We retain this 
information by breaking down membership into the length preceding the introduction of the web-
portal (Pre-Membership), the length of membership after the introduction (Post-Membership), and 
a indicator variable to capture those who were only members since the web portal was introduced .12 
Variance inflation factors (VIF) were estimated with the highest (2.36) for Pre-Web Membership 
suggesting multicollinearilty is within acceptable limits (Chatterjee, Hadi, and Price 2000). 
4.2.1. Marginal effects—direction of influence 
Estimated marginal effects are presented in Table 3. Consistent with the previous analysis of 
caller behaviour, males were more likely to be in the Not Called, No Web and less likely to be in the 
Called, No Web groups. However, the marginal effect of males was positive for Web Only, or Web 
and Called groups. Though these effects were small, the overall predicted probability of being in the 
Web Only group (3.3%) and Called and Web group (11.9%) is small. Taken together, the results 
suggest greater preference for the call centre by females and web portal by males. 
The marginal effect of Account Balance and Salary are larger for the likelihood of not using either 
(Not Called and No Web) when compared with the Not Called category of the previous estimation. 
Those with larger account balances and higher salaries are less likely not to make use of both the call 
centre and the web portal. The reverse is true for the likelihood of using the call centre and the web 
portal together (Called, Web). Member account balance and salary significantly increases the 
likelihood of using both. Account Balance is also positively associated with being in the Called, No 
Web group and the Web, Not Called group. The more resources, the more likely the member to use 
the advice facility. Member account balance, however, has a relatively larger impact for using the call 
centre than using the web portal. 
[Insert Table 3] 
                                                     
12 We expect membership length to be important, however, those comfortable with the avenues of seeking 
advice before the web-portal was available may be different to those who always had the portal available.  
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4.2.2. Economic magnitude of effects on calling behaviour and web portal use 
To provide a better sense of the economic magnitude, combinations of Gender, Account Balance, 
and Age were considered. A younger (33-year old), female with a small ($13,000) account balance 
has a 44% probability of not using either the call centre or web portal. If the account balance was 
instead $100,000 the probability drops to 23 percent. For males, the same inputs yields 47 percent 
and 24 percent respectively. Looking to predict those who use both the call centre and the web, the 
younger female with a small account balance has a 10 percent probability compared with 20 percent 
for the equivalent member with a large account balance. For males, this relative difference is the 
same at 12 and 26 percent respectively. In short, size and account balance, affect whether a member 
uses the call centre and web portal. 
Finally, age appears to have a differential role. For example, a young (33-year old), low account 
balance, female member has a 43 percent probability of being in the Called, No Web group. The 
equivalent 50-year old member has a 48 percent probability. The same comparison for the Web, Not 
Called group yields 2.9% for the younger member and 2.6% for the 50-year old. Older members 
have a greater likelihood of using the resource but more so for the call centre.  
5. A singular event: Announcement of policy reform 
A further robustness check for drivers of advice-seeking is investigated focusing on a singular 
event during the time span of our database. Government policy reforms on retirement incomes offer 
singular events which have a shared impact among members, in contrast to the previous discussion 
which focused primarily on member characteristics. The data period includes one such event. In May 
2006, the federal government announced its intention to ‘simplify and streamline superannuation’. 
By December 2006, the government had introduced legislation which came into effect on July 1st, 
2007. 13  Significantly, provisions regarding tax treatment of savings and benefit payments were 
modified. Prior age-based contributions were streamlined and limits on account balances accumulated 
abolished. Benefit payments were to be treated as tax-free for people 60 years and over, and benefits 
paid to those under 60 years separated into tax-free and taxable components.  
These were significant policy changes and the government gave notice more than a year before 
their implementation. Public commentary on implications was widespread and punctuated by events 
that brought the issues before the public. Funds, their agents, and financial advisers discussed the 
changes. By this account, information on the reform of the policy framework was more likely 
‘ubiquitous’ rather  than ‘discrete’, with implications for those interested in making provision for their imminent 
retirement and those planning for retirement sometime in the future. It is arguable these provisions were most relevant 
to those aged 60 years or over (contemplating imminent retirement) and those 50 years or over (planning for 
retirement). For the first group, these changes could have affected retirement decisions (discrete decisions) whereas 
for the second group these changes may have prompted making a series of changes over the longer term. 
                                                     
13 Commonwealth of Australia, Tax Laws Amendment (Simplified Superannuation) Act 2007. 
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5.1.1. Calling frequency and moments 
With respect to the pattern of advice-seeking by members in the Mercer ST, it has been noted that the single 
most important spike in call volume occurred in the three weeks prior to July 1st, 200714 and the day immediately 
following. Notwithstanding the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, this event stands out as 
exceptional in relation to the entire 2004–2013 period.15 Here, then, is a test of the robustness of previous findings 
as regards the status and relative significance of various predictors of advice-seeking behaviour. Notice, web 
enquiries were not relevant in this case because this facility had not yet been introduced. 
Having established the call ‘window’ as June 12th through July 2nd, 2007, those calling before the July 1st moment 
were deemed leaders and those calling after deemed followers. Excluded were frequent callers who might have 
called anyway (2,387), and those that called both before and after the July 1st moment within the call window (51). 
This left 7,710 leaders and 437 followers.16 
Within the window, the period leading up to the July 1st moment was obviously far longer than the period 
immediately following. Also, there were many more callers before the moment than after the implementation of 
the legislation. Consideration was given to the Gender, Age, Membership, Account Balance, Salary, and Salary 
Sacrifice commitments of leaders and followers. Panel A of Table 4 presents descriptive results which suggests 
that there were no differences between average Gender, Age, and Membership commitment of leaders and 
followers. However, tests for differences amongst leaders and followers in terms of the distribution of participants 
around the mean of each variable suggests statistically significant differences between leaders and followers on 
Age (nonparametric and parametric) and Salary (nonparametric only). It would seem that leaders and followers 
came from the same sample on Gender, Account Balance, and Membership. 
[Insert Table 4] 
5.1.2. Estimated model—call behaviour (window and non-window) 
A logit model was estimated for the entire period leading-up to June 12th, 2007 and (separately) through the 
period of the ‘window’ June 12th–July 2nd, 2007. At issue, as in the previous analysis, was the probability of 
calling. For consistency, frequent callers were excluded from both samples and overlapping callers were excluded 
leaving 89,584 pre-window callers and 10,51617 in the window callers’ sample. The results are summarised in 
Panel B of Table 4. Gender, Age, Account Balance, Salary, and Membership were significant for both samples, a 
finding broadly consistent with the findings on the type of caller against the base case. Notice, however, the Gender, 
Account Balance, Salary, and Membership effects were stronger for callers during the window than for callers 
over the prior period. While Age was significant for both samples, its effect was stronger over the prior period than 
through the window.  
                                                     
14 To choose the starting date of the window we controlled for heteroskedasticity and tested its significance via 
an ARCH(1) model. We ranked the weighted rate of change (WRoc), the rate of absolute change in the daily 
frequency of calls, with the single most relevant daily Roc in the whole of 2007 being June 12th. 
15 See Figure 1. 
16 Web access is an indicator variable (accessed the web or not) in our database. We estimated a multinomial 
logistic model regarding the advice seeking tool within and prior to the peak window, but no significant 
differences were found and we therefore focus on calling behaviour. 




The analysis is important as it sheds light on the salience of news in driving macroeconomic 
actions. As Ramey (2011) did with respect to the identification of government expenditure shocks, 
we too find a dynamic process for the announced reform to affect the individual decision making. 
Differently from that study, the dynamics we detect are concentrated in a small neighbourhood of 
the change itself thus signalling a minimisation of the announcement effect.  
5.5 Exploring what advice is sought and by whom 
Section 4 explained how call topic(s) are recorded which enables their categorisation as Administrative, 
Investment, or Retirement Planning related. This permits an analysis of what advice is sought and by whom. 
However, a significant limitation is that the relative importance attached to topics isn’t recorded. Hence, 
while the focus is unambiguous when only one topic group is raised, when two or more are raised there is 
possible ambiguity.  To permit an analysis we explore the dominant topic, defined as the topic category 
logged most in a call. In multiple topic calls where Investment and Retirement Planning topics collectively 
dominate Administration topics, we classify the call according to whether Investment or Retirement topics 
are logged more. Thus we identify Administration dominant, Investment dominant, Retirement Planning 
dominant calls, and a fourth group for those with no dominant topic. To these groups we add a fifth, those 
that don’t call at all.  
With calls classified we estimated predicted group membership using the same predictor variables. We utilise a 
member’s complete membership and estimate a multilevel mixed effects multinomial logistic regression accounting 
for repeat callers with individual random effects and allow correlation of residuals at sub-plan level.  We note that in 
the overall sample, the majority of calls involve four topics or less (96 percent). The largest proportion of calls is 
Administrative dominant (37 percent) with Investment accounting for 26 percent, 20 percent Retirement Planning, and 
17 percent with no clear dominant topic. Figure 5 demonstrates there is remarkably little variation in the dominant 
advice topic sought over time. 
[Insert Figure 5] 
Our previous analysis identified that males were less likely to call and Table 5 suggests this is the case for 
Administrative, Retirement Planning and Other topic calls but not Investment dominant. Account Balance and Salary 
were identified as positive advice predictors and Table 5 suggests this is true across all topics for Account Balance but 
for Salary this is only true for Investment and Other whereas it is not significant for Administration and is negative for 
Retirement Planning. Younger members and those with a shorter tenure are more likely to call for Administrative topics 
whereas older members, and those who have been with the fund longer, are more likely to call for Investment or Other. 
As expected, older members are more likely to call for Retirement Planning. 
[Insert Table 5] 
Finally, we explored variation in predictors over time by estimating within separate years, rather than overall. As 
suggested by Figure 5, just as the spread of topics varies little over time the predictors also display a consistent pattern. 
We present an example of this in Table S.6 in the supplementary file. An additional insight from this analysis is that it 
allows a control for prior advice seeking history. Prior advice seeking is a positive predictor of future advice, and more 
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so in the same advice area. For example, while all types of advice seeking were positively related to seeking advice for 
an investment purpose, the largest effect was for where the prior advice sought was also investment. 
6. Conclusions 
Two key points should be made before considering the implications of findings. First, our study is set 
in an institutional context which we expect participants to view as at least benign 18  (unsullied by a 
commercial interest in giving advice) and/or supportive of participants’ decision-making (being a ‘service’ 
provided by the employers’ agent). We note that our analysis does not have access to participant traits or 
attitudes including their trust in the fund which may also explain behaviour such as advice seeking or 
monitoring (Deetlefs, et al. in press).19 Second, in large part, it is reasonable to suppose that advice-seeking 
is not a case of ‘primed’ behaviour—that is, in some way differentially encouraged or induced by the 
agent.20 As such, observed patterns of advice-seeking should be seen as voluntary. 
The paper’s premise is that individuals seek advice when confronting an issue that is salient or claims 
their attention over and above other issues that tax an individual’s cognitive and decision-making resources. 
Overall, it was found that the predictors of advice-seeking were gender (female rather than male), age 
(older than younger), account balance (larger than smaller), and experience (longer rather than shorter). 
Note the gender effect was less evident once the web-portal was introduced (the portal drew in younger 
male advice-seekers than the call facility). Most people in our sample, most of the time, do not make 
a retirement savings ‘decision’ and do not seek advice. A minority sought advice over the period 
2004–2013 and, among the advice-seekers, a majority sought advice just once. Furthermore, advice-
seekers were a special segment of the Super Trust members - those that had an immediate and 
substantial stake in the performance and structure of the superannuation system.  
This brings us to the singular event; that is, the spike in call activity which occurred in June 2007 prior 
to the web-portal. We found no difference between those that called before and those that called after. 
Looking at the window period, the gender effect swamped all the others.21 The account balance effect 
was less important than experience in the fund compared to previous findings over the entire period 
(with or without the web-user factor). Likewise, being older rather than younger was less important. 
There is a measure of continuity joining the entire period with the spike in call activity; 
nevertheless it is arguable that the latter was actually ‘different’ than the patterns observed 
elsewhere. It is notable, in fact, that during the singular event window the volume of calls virtually 
doubled (June 2007), the gender effect was more pronounced and salary effect dominated, rather 
than the account balance effect. 
                                                     
18 On the effect of ‘self-interest’ on the effectiveness of financial advice see Kuang, Weber, and Dana (2007). 
19 We also note that the attitudinal information can only be collected for a subset of members, which Deetlefs, et al. 
(in press) note present with a more engaged profile, whereas here we can utilise the full membership in our analysis. 
20 To the extent this is not the case, for example where targeted member engagement campaigns were used over the 
period by the fund, a secondary analysis controlling for fixed year effects provides consistent results. 
21 This holds even if the incentive effects of a large account balance are held in abeyance. Being female increased the 
probability of seeking advice over the entire period and, especially, during the ‘window’ containing the singular event.  
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Our results are surprising in that those seeking advice during the singular event window did so 
as the window closed, not when these changes were first mooted, or when legislation passed. Why 
procrastinate and wait until the last moment to seek advice? Three possible explanations are relevant. 
First, whereas we conceptualised retirement planning as a ‘continuous’ decision  situated in a world 
of ubiquitous information, it could be the case that most participants treat these types of decisions as 
‘discrete’, only paying attention when an issue arises that is so significant that it ‘activates’ them.22 
Second, given the flow of information, most people realised they could, in fact, wait until the last 
moment before acting on their intentions and when they responded, a significant portion sought advice 
before acting (if at all). Third, having announced its intention government prompted participants to 
delay making a commitment until they had to (thereby freeing attention for other issues).  
Three factors could explain the evidence on patterns of advice-seeking across the entire period 
with respect to calling versus not calling, calling versus not calling with or without the web facility, 
not calling, and being an average caller (or a frequent caller), against calling just once. Specifically, 
these results can be explained by reference to the issue of gender, stage of life -cycle, and material 
well-being. The spike in calling, though, would seem to warrant deeper analysis than that shown 
above. 
A preliminary investigation of the predictors of the dominant type of advice sought suggested 
relatively little variation over time. Predictors of who called were also influential predictors for what 
advice was sought. Additionally the positive role of salary was isolated to seeking investment advice 
whereas account balance was influential across all topics. Age positively predicted, as expect ed, 
seeking retirement planning advice. 
Having identified the significant correlates of seeking advice our results allow speculation as to 
the underlying driver at work in each which might serve to mobilise the interest of retirement savings 
plan participants. For instance, the finding that web-users are younger, have lower account balances, 
and have less experience in retirement savings plans implies that this is a ‘pathway’ that could be 
utilised by sub-plans and agents to encourage participants to take advantage of the advice facility. 
Similarly, the significance of gender suggests that female participants could also be brought into 
affinity groups (stratified by account balance, experience, etc.) with issue -specific foci. Likewise, 
bringing in men into the equation would seem to need a distinctive strategy, rather than a generic 
strategy. While our results are only a first step in better understanding the patterns of participant -
initiated advice-seeking, they suggest that mobilising participants may be more successful when 
framed around specific topics rather than assuming retirement planning and saving for the future is 
salient to all, whatever the circumstances. 
                                                     
22 This explanation can be buttressed by recent research in cognitive science to the effect that many people compress 
complex issues, spread over time, into distinct issues amenable to routine treatment, until these heuristics can’t be 
applied or the magnitude of an issue becomes concerning. The logic of the issue is deliberately violated, then, so as 
to economise on effort (over time). Where an issue is presented that demands effort outside of the parameters of the 
decision-rule, those that put in the effort appear to be those for whom the issue is most salient. This provides a 
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Determinants of advice seeking within defined contribution retirement savings schemes 
TABLES 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics about caller types 
This table provides summary statistics of calling and web user characteristics. 
 n Mean SD n Mean SD 
 Not Called   Not Called and No Web 
Gender 316629 0.61 0.489 68708 0.6290 0.48 
Age 316629 41.77 11.84 68708 41.8948 10.86 
Account Balance 236328 29850.37 66490.45 53317 8.7769 1.76 
Salary 145593 67083.76 45928.91 19843 10.78 0.50 
Membership 316629 2.72 2.64    
Membership-Pre_Web    68708 1.13 1.78 
Membership-Post_Web    68708 3.42 1.92 
                             Called Once  Called but No Web 
Gender 97975 0.603 0.49 30693 0.59 0.49 
Age 97975 43.10 10.99 30693 44.93 11.15 
Account Balance 89206 48833.60 90725.38 28814 9.60 1.64 
Salary 54973 77777.68 52937.09 12216 10.94 0.55 
Membership 97975 3.98 3.13    
Membership-Pre_Web    30693 2.23 2.15 
Membership-Post_Web    30693 2.54 2.05 
Called Average (2-7)  Web but No Called 
Gender 130549 0.62 0.48 146685 0.60 0.49 
Age 130549 46.40 11.42 146685 38.14 11.02 
Account Balance 119819 78341.66 129389.20 120127 8.78 1.84 
Salary 74623 89710.37 65024.78 83886 11.02 0.56 
Membership 130549 4.96 3.29    
Membership-Pre_Web    146685 0.60 1.50 
Membership-Post_Web    146685 4.47 1.20 
Called Frequently (>7)  Called and Web 
Gender 22338 0.68 0.46 176979 0.63 0.48 
Age 22338 53.73 11.34 176979 45.26 11.48 
Account Balance 19250 132721.40 192507.70 161138 10.14 1.51 
Salary 12718 104060.10 79753.30 105069 11.18 0.57 
Membership 22338 6.41 3.25    
Membership-Pre_Web    176979 1.82 2.28 
Membership-Post_Web    176979 4.15 1.44 
      Correlations 
 Gender Age Account Balance Salary Membership Pre-Web 
Gender       
Age 0.1135***     
Balance 0.1496*** 0.4649***    
Salary 0.2336*** 0.1705***      0.4093***   
Membership 0.0552*** 0.2360***      0.5535***  0.1018***  




Table 2 Marginal Effects for Caller Behaviour 
This table presents the marginal effects from a multinomial logit estimation of the likelihood of being in 
one of four calling behaviour groups: Not Called; Called Once; Average Caller; and Frequent Caller. 
Marginal effects are for a unit change in each variable at mean values of remaining variables. Group 
membership is estimated as a function of gender, age, account balance (natural log), salary (natural log), 
membership length in sub-plan, and member location (state). Two dummy variables are included to capture 
if a member had no web access available (No Web Access) and if they had web access and used it (Access, 
Web User), with the omitted category those who had access but had not used the web. Additionally, gender, 
account balance and age are allowed to interact. Dummy variables for member location (state) are included 
but not tabulated. Residuals are clustered at sub-plan level. 




    Z p-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
Predicted outcome: Not Called (50.1% probability at mean values, 50.5% sample)  
Male 0.0473 0.0036 13.09 0.0000 0.0402 0.0543 
Age -0.0026 0.0002 -11.95 0.0000 -0.0031 -0.0022 
Account Balance -0.0663 0.0025 -26.87 0.0000 -0.0711 -0.0615 
Salary -0.0445 0.0066 -6.74 0.0000 -0.0574 -0.0315 
Membership -0.0180 0.0017 -10.73 0.0000 -0.0213 -0.0147 
No Web Access -0.0860 0.0151 -5.70 0.0000 -0.1156 -0.0564 
Access, Web User -0.3072 0.0101 -30.33 0.0000 -0.3270 -0.2873 
Predicted outcome: Called Once (22.3% probability at mean values, 19.1% sample)  
Male -0.0147 0.0020 -7.43 0.0000 -0.0186 -0.0108 
Age -0.0010 0.0001 -11.56 0.0000 -0.0011 -0.0008 
Account Balance 0.0047 0.0013 3.58 0.0000 0.0021 0.0073 
Salary 0.0100 0.0020 4.96 0.0000 0.0061 0.0140 
Membership 0.0051 0.0009 5.74 0.0000 0.0034 0.0068 
No Web Access 0.0195 0.0052 3.76 0.0000 0.0093 0.0296 
Access, Web User 0.0451 0.0061 7.45 0.0000 0.0332 0.0570 
Predicted outcome: Called Average (25.6% probability at mean values, 26.0% sample)  
Male -0.0309 0.0031 -9.85 0.0000 -0.0371 -0.0248 
Age 0.0025 0.0002 14.16 0.0000 0.0021 0.0028 
Account Balance 0.0544 0.0024 22.77 0.0000 0.0498 0.0591 
Salary 0.0302 0.0056 5.38 0.0000 0.0192 0.0411 
Membership 0.0109 0.0010 11.40 0.0000 0.0090 0.0128 
No Web Access 0.0609 0.0095 6.42 0.0000 0.0423 0.0794 
Access, Web User 0.2239 0.0057 39.56 0.0000 0.2128 0.2350 
Predicted outcome: Called Frequently (2.0% probability at mean values, 4.4% sample)  
Male -0.0016 0.0010 -1.69 0.0910 -0.0035 0.0003 
Age 0.0011 0.0000 28.98 0.0000 0.0010 0.0012 
Account Balance 0.0072 0.0003 20.48 0.0000 0.0065 0.0078 
Salary 0.0043 0.0010 4.47 0.0000 0.0024 0.0062 
Membership 0.0020 0.0002 12.48 0.0000 0.0017 0.0023 
No Web Access 0.0057 0.0011 5.00 0.0000 0.0035 0.0079 
Access, Web User 0.0382 0.0011 33.98 0.0000 0.0360 0.0404 
N   285,268   




Table 3 Marginal Effects for Web and Call Access Combination 
This table presents the marginal effects from a multinomial logit estimation of the likelihood of being in one 
of four calling and web-use behaviour groups: Not Called and No Web; Called Only; Web Only; Called and 
Web. Marginal effects are for a unit change in each variable at mean values of remaining variables. Group 
membership is estimated as a function of gender, age, account balance (natural log), salary (natural log), Pre-
membership experience (membership length in years prior to introduction of web), Post-membership 
experience (membership length in years after introduction of web), and Post-Only (Dummy with value one 
is only became member after introduction of Web). Additionally, gender, account balance and age are 
allowed to interact. Dummy variables for member location (state) are included but not reported. Residuals 
clustered at sub-plan. 
 Marginal  
Effect 
Standard             
Error 
     Z                  p-value              [95% Conf. Interval] 
Predicted outcome: Not Called and No Web (43.24% probability at mean values) 
Male 0.0361 0.0042  8.51 0.0000 0.0278 0.0444 
Age -0.0036 0.0002 -16.51 0.0000 -0.0041 -0.0032 
Account Balance -0.1068 0.0045 -24.00 0.0000 -0.1156 -0.0981 
Salary -0.0582 0.0107 -5.42 0.0000 -0.0792 -0.0371 
Pre-Membership -0.0007 0.0021 -0.33 0.7430 -0.0048 0.0034 
Post-Membership 0.0092 0.0056 1.63 0.1020 -0.0018 0.0202 
Post-Only 0.1140 0.0162 7.02 0.0000 0.0822 0.1458 
Predicted outcome: Called, No Web (41.50% probability at mean values)  
Male -0.0617 0.0039 -15.88 0.0000 -0.0693 -0.0541 
Age 0.0032 0.0002 17.61 0.0000 0.0029 0.0036 
Account Balance 0.0561 0.0025 22.06 0.0000 0.0511 0.0611 
Salary -0.0157 0.0064 -2.47 0.0130 -0.0281 -0.0032 
Pre-Membership 0.0042 0.0019 2.19 0.0280 0.0004 0.0080 
Post-Membership -0.0418 0.0024 -17.51 0.0000 -0.0465 -0.0371 
Post-Only -0.0977 0.0082 -11.90 0.0000 -0.1138 -0.0816 
Predicted outcome: Web, Not Called (3.28% probability at mean values)  
Male 0.0085 0.0015 5.67 0.0000 0.0056 0.0115 
Age -0.0003 0.0001 -4.95 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0002 
Account Balance 0.0026 0.0010 2.52 0.0120 0.0006 0.0047 
Salary 0.0158 0.0020 7.97 0.0000 0.0119 0.0197 
Pre-Membership -0.0016 0.0005 -2.91 0.0040 -0.0027 -0.0005 
Post-Membership 0.0091 0.0011 8.10 0.0000 0.0069 0.0113 
Post-Only 0.0121 0.0025 4.83 0.0000 0.0072 0.0170 
Predicted outcome: Called and Web (11.96% probability at mean values)  
Male 0.0171 0.0033 5.22 0.0000 0.0107 0.0235 
Age 0.0007 0.0001 4.71 0.0000 0.0004 0.0010 
Account Balance 0.0481 0.0042 11.53 0.0000 0.0399 0.0563 
Salary 0.0580 0.0056 10.40 0.0000 0.0471 0.0690 
Pre-Membership -0.0020 0.0009 -2.07 0.0380 -0.0038 -0.0001 
Post-Membership 0.0235 0.0027 8.88 0.0000 0.0183 0.0287 
Post-Only -0.0284 0.0085 -3.32 0.0010 -0.0451 -0.0116 
n   216,998   




Table 4 Singular Event Analysis 
This table reports descriptive statistics and estimation results for a logistic regression of calling behaviour during 
the singular event period. Panel A provides the descriptive statistics and Panel B has the two sample estimations. In 
Panel A the call ‘window’ is June 12th through to July 2nd, 2007. ‘Leaders’ are those who called before the July 
1st and those that called after that moment were deemed ‘Followers’.  In Panel B the logistic regression estimations 
are for a ‘Non-Window’ sample for the period leading-up to June 12th, 2007 and a ‘Window’ sample being for June 
12th–July 2nd, 2007 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 Observations Mean Standard Deviation 
 Leaders Followers Leaders Followers Leaders Followers 
Male 7710 437 0.57 0.57 0.50 0.50 
Age 7710 437 46.00 44.72 11.19 10.72 
Membership 7710 437 5.65 5.60 3 3 
Account Balance 7138 390 53,405 48,251 98,163 65,751 
Salary 5001 294 72,905 78,522 66,450 55,643 
  
Panel B: Logistic Regression 
 Coefficient Std. Err Z P>z [95% conf. int.] 
Non-Window Sample Caller 
Male -0.180 0.012 -14.550 0.0000 -0.204 -0.156 
Age 0.033 0.001 59.660 0.0000 0.032 0.034 
Account Balance 0.122 0.003 40.820 0.0000 0.116 0.128 
Membership 0.158 0.002 79.840 0.0000 0.154 0.162 
Salary 0.009 0.002 5.400 0.0000 0.006 0.012 
Constant -3.520 0.055 -64.130 0.0000 -3.628 -3.413 
Window Sample Caller 
Male -0.280 0.037 -7.560 0.0000 -0.352 -0.207 
Age 0.015 0.002 8.240 0.0000 0.011 0.018 
Account Balance 0.038 0.008 4.510 0.0000 0.021 0.054 
Membership 0.195 0.005 40.460 0.0000 0.186 0.204 
Salary 0.014 0.005 2.860 0.0040 0.004 0.023 




Table 5 Advice Seeking Topics 
This table presents results from an estimation of the likelihood a member seeks advice classified by the dominant topic 
of a call. Five calling groups are included: Administration dominant; Investment dominant; Retirement Planning 
dominant; Other topics; and Not called (results not tabulated). A multilevel mixed effects multinomial logit model is 
estimated with, in addition to the fixed effects reported, individual random effects included with residuals allowed to 
correlate at sub-plan level. Average marginal effects are presented with the sample including all members with at least 
one full year of membership. 




         Z   p-value                [95% Conf. Interval] 
                                                          Administration Dominant (27% of dominant classification) 
Male -0.0082 0.0033 -2.44 0.0150 -0.0147 -0.0159 
Account Balance 0.0705 0.0077 9.18 0.0000 0.0554 0.0855 
Salary -0.0045 0.0077 -0.58 0.5590 -0.0195 0.0106 
Membership -0.0185 0.0014 -13.52 0.0000 -0.0212 -0.0158 
Age -0.0086 0.0001 -60.73 0.0000 -0.0089 -0.0083 
                                     Investment Dominant (19% of dominant classification) 
Male 0.0003 0.0019 0.15 0.8770 -0.0034 0.0039 
Account Balance 0.0172 0.0011 15.44 0.0000 0.0151 0.0194 
Salary 0.0436 0.0038 11.46 0.0000 0.0361 0.0511 
Membership 0.0017 0.0005 3.13 0.0020 0.0006 0.0028 
Age 0.0007 0.0002 4.19 0.0000 0.0004 0.0010 
                                  Retirement Planning Dominant (15% of dominant classification) 
Male -0.0088 0.0041 -2.15 0.0310 -0.0168 -0.0008 
Account Balance 0.0160 0.0017 9.55 0.0000 0.0127 0.0193 
Salary -0.0300 0.0042 -7.16 0.0000 -0.0382 -0.0218 
Membership -0.0014 0.0014 -0.98 0.3280 -0.0042 0.0014 
Age 0.0058 0.0001 46.29 0.0000 0.0056 0.0060 
                                                                    Other Topics (12% of dominant classification)  
Male -0.0115 0.0021 -5.36 0.0000 -0.0157 -0.0073 
Account Balance 0.0108 0.0009 11.82 0.0000 0.0090 0.0126 
Salary 0.0121 0.0022 5.5 0.0000 0.0078 0.0165 
Membership 0.0021 0.0007 2.97 0.0030 0.0007 0.0035 
Age 0.0008 0.0001 6.22 0.0000 0.0005 0.0010 
n   379,495   






Determinants of advice seeking within defined contribution retirement savings schemes 
Table S.1 Correlation Estimations of the Percentage Changes in Seasonally Adjusted  
Macroeconomic Indicators and Consumer Sentiment  
This table presents the pairwise correlation between the percentage change in quarterly (monthly in brackets) 
macroeconomic indicators and measures of consumer sentiment (seasonally adjusted). The macroeconomic variables are 
changes in the: All Ordinaries Index (Australian Stock Market); GDP (GDP); and Employed Total Persons (Full Time 
Employed). A measure of consumer expectations is based on expectations about economic conditions in the next 12-months 
and five-years as well as unemployment expectations sourced from the Westpac-Melbourne Institute Survey of Consumer 
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Table S.2 Change in Calling and Macroeconomic Conditions and Consumer Sentiment 
This table provides coefficients and robust standard errors from a regression of the percentage change in the 
volume of calls against the percentage change in macroeconomic indicators and consumer sentiment. The 
macroeconomic variables are quarterly changes in the: All Ordinaries Index (Australian Stock Market); GDP 
(GDP); and Employed Total Persons (Employed). A measure of consumer sentiment is based on expectations 
about economic conditions in the next five-years sourced from the Westpac-Melbourne Institute Survey of 
Consumer Sentiment. Augmented Dickey Fuller test reject a unit root for all variables. 
         Coefficient      Robust  SE             t-test              p-value           [95% Conf. Int.] 
Australian Stock Market 0.1793    0.4199 0.43 0.673 -0.6823     1.0409 
GDP 2.9674    4.9224 0.60 0.552 -7.13253     13.0674 
Employed 9.1144    7.0901 1.29 0.210 -5.43333     23.6620 
Economic Conditions (5 years) 0.1034    0.5023      0.21 0.838 -0.9272    1.1339 
Constant -0.0395    0.0505     -0.78 0.441 -0.1432     0.0642 
 N=32, Adjusted R-squared = 0.0606, F-test (3,28) 0.55, p-value 0.6988 
Data Source: Datastream, Westpac-Melbourne Institute Survey of Consumer Sentiment, Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
Labour Force Australia, Catalogue No. 6202.0.
S.31 
 
Table S.3 Marginal Effects for Caller Behaviour – Re-estimation, Monthly Call Threshold 
This table presents the re-estimation of marginal effects reported in Table 2 of the main article with an alternative 
treatment of call events. Here a call is only considered a unique event if it is at least one month after an earlier call. 
The marginal effects are estimated from a multinomial logit estimation of the likelihood of being in one of four calling 
behaviour groups: Not Called; Called Once; Average Caller; and Frequent Caller. Marginal effects are for a unit 
change in each variable at mean values of remaining variables. Group membership is estimated as a function of 
gender, age, balance (natural log), salary (natural log), membership length in sub-plan, and member location (state). 
Two dummy variables are included to capture if a member had no web access available (No Web Access) and if they 
had web access and used it (Access, Web User), with the omitted category those who had access but had not used the 
web. Additionally, gender, balance and age are allowed to interact. Dummy variables for member location (state) are 
included but not tabulated. Residuals are clustered at sub-plan level. 




      Z   p-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
Predicted outcome: Not Called (50.12 % probability at mean values, 55.8% sample)  
Male 0.0470 0.0036 13.10 0.0000 0.0400 0.0541 
Age -0.0027 0.0002 -12.45 0.0000 -0.0032 -0.0023 
Account Balance -0.0667 0.0025 -27.11 0.0000 -0.0715 -0.0619 
Salary -0.0433 0.0066 -6.60 0.0000 -0.0562 -0.0305 
Membership -0.0175 0.0017 -10.42 0.0000 -0.0208 -0.0142 
No Web Access -0.0853 0.0150 -5.67 0.0000 -0.1148 -0.0558 
Access, Web User 0.0470 0.0036 13.10 0.0000 0.0400 0.0541 
Predicted outcome: Called Once (22.3 % probability at mean values, 17.3% sample)  
Male -0.0151 0.0020 -7.63 0.0000 -0.0190 -0.0112 
Age -0.0010 0.0001 -11.72 0.0000 -0.0011 -0.0008 
Account Balance 0.0045 0.0013 3.45 0.0010 0.0019 0.0071 
Salary 0.0109 0.0021 5.32 0.0000 0.0069 0.0149 
Membership 0.0055 0.0009 6.18 0.0000 0.0037 0.0072 
No Web Access 0.0203 0.0052 3.89 0.0000 0.0101 0.0305 
Access, Web User -0.0151 0.0020 -7.63 0.0000 -0.0190 -0.0112 
Predicted outcome: Called Average (25.7 % probability at mean values, 23.0% sample)  
Male -0.0283 0.0032 -8.85 0.0000 -0.0345 -0.0220 
Age 0.0029 0.0002 17.07 0.0000 0.0026 0.0032 
Account Balance 0.0548 0.0024 23.1 0.0000 0.0502 0.0595 
Salary 0.0275 0.0057 4.8 0.0000 0.0162 0.0387 
Membership 0.0097 0.0010 9.98 0.0000 0.0078 0.0116 
No Web Access 0.0545 0.0093 5.84 0.0000 0.0362 0.0727 
Access, Web User -0.0283 0.0032 -8.85 0.0000 -0.0345 -0.0220 
Predicted outcome: Called Frequently (1.8 % probability at mean values, 3.9% sample)  
Male -0.0036 0.0008 -4.42 0.0000 -0.0052 -0.0020 
Age 0.0008 0.0000 25.27 0.0000 0.0008 0.0009 
Account Balance 0.0074 0.0004 20.61 0.0000 0.0067 0.0081 
Salary 0.0050 0.0008 5.86 0.0000 0.0033 0.0066 
Membership 0.0023 0.0002 14 0.0000 0.0020 0.0026 
No Web Access 0.0106 0.0012 8.56 0.0000 0.0081 0.0130 
Access, Web User -0.0036 0.0008 -4.42 0.0000 -0.0052 -0.0020 
N   285,268   




Table S.4 Caller Behaviour: Re-estimation, Including Education 
This table presents the re-estimation of marginal effects reported in Table 2 of the main article with the additional 
variable included being University Education, measured as the proportion of individuals in the member’s postcode with 
at least an undergraduate college degree. The marginal effects are estimated from a multinomial logit estimation of the 
likelihood of being in one of four calling behaviour groups: Not Called; Called Once; Average Caller; and Frequent 
Caller. Marginal effects are for a unit change in each variable at mean values of remaining variables. Group membership 
is estimated as a function of gender, age, balance (natural log), salary (natural log), membership length in sub-plan, and 
member location (state). Two dummy variables are included to capture if a member had no web access available (No 
Web Access) and if they had web access and used it (Access, Web User), with the omitted category those who had 
access but had not used the web. Additionally, gender, balance and age are allowed to interact. Dummy variables for 
member location (state) are included but not tabulated. Residuals are clustered at sub-plan level. 




       Z   p-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
Predicted outcome: Not Called (44.9 % probability at mean values, 50.5% sample)  
Male 0.0510 0.0038 13.35 0.0000 0.0435 0.0585 
Age -0.0020 0.0002 -7.97 0.0000 -0.0025 -0.0015 
Account Balance -0.0769 0.0028 -27.34 0.0000 -0.0824 -0.0714 
Salary -0.0361 0.0066 -5.44 0.0000 -0.0491 -0.0231 
Membership -0.0146 0.0019 -7.77 0.0000 -0.0182 -0.0109 
No Web Access -0.0960 0.0157 -6.12 0.0000 -0.1268 -0.0653 
Access, Web User -0.2935 0.0094 -31.27 0.0000 -0.3119 -0.2751 
University Education -0.0003 0.0001 -2.20 0.0280 -0.0006 0.0000 
Predicted outcome: Called Once (23.0 % probability at mean values, 19.1% sample)  
  Male -0.0149 0.0026 -5.75 0.0000 -0.0199 -0.0098 
Age -0.0017 0.0001 -18.63 0.0000 -0.0018 -0.0015 
Account Balance 0.0064 0.0019 3.31 0.0010 0.0026 0.0102 
Salary 0.0044 0.0029 1.53 0.1250 -0.0012 0.0101 
Membership 0.0034 0.0010 3.55 0.0000 0.0015 0.0052 
No Web Access 0.0148 0.0049 3.02 0.0020 0.0052 0.0243 
Access, Web User 0.0265 0.0052 5.09 0.0000 0.0163 0.0367 
University Education -0.0001 0.0001 -1.47 0.1420 -0.0002 0.0000 
Predicted outcome: Called Average (29.4 % probability at mean values, 26.0% sample)  
Male -0.0336 0.0035 -9.6 0.0000 -0.0404 -0.0267 
Age 0.0021 0.0002 10.11 0.0000 0.0017 0.0025 
Account Balance 0.0623 0.0031 20.38 0.0000 0.0563 0.0683 
Salary 0.0261 0.0059 4.39 0.0000 0.0144 0.0377 
Membership 0.0090 0.0011 8.14 0.0000 0.0068 0.0111 
No Web Access 0.0727 0.0104 6.99 0.0000 0.0523 0.0931 
Access, Web User 0.2219 0.0057 39.21 0.0000 0.2109 0.2330 
University Education 0.0003 0.0001 2.73 0.0060 0.0001 0.0005 
Predicted outcome: Called Frequently (2.6 % probability at mean values, 4.4% sample)  
Male -0.0026 0.0013 -2.05 0.0400 -0.0051 -0.0001 
Age 0.0015 0.0000 30.74 0.0000 0.0014 0.0016 
Account Balance 0.0082 0.0005 16.12 0.0000 0.0072 0.0092 
Salary 0.0056 0.0012 4.86 0.0000 0.0033 0.0079 
Membership 0.0022 0.0002 10.22 0.0000 0.0018 0.0026 
No Web Access 0.0085 0.0014 6.14 0.0000 0.0058 0.0113 
Access, Web User 0.0451 0.0013 33.84 0.0000 0.0425 0.0477 
University Education 0.0001 0.0000 3.1000 0.0020 0.0000 0.0002 
N   224,422   




Table S.5 Marginal Effects for Caller Behaviour – Panel Logit Estimation 
This table presents the marginal effects from a panel logit estimation of the likelihood of making a call in 
any year. This is the complement to the estimation presented in Table 2 of the main document. Whereas 
in Table 2 the estimation examines the whole membership and categorises each member into one of four 
groups (Not Called; Called Once; Average Caller; and Frequent Caller) here we have an indicator variable 
for each year for whether a member made a call (yes = 1). The estimation allows for random effects at 
sub-plan and individual member level. Robust standard errors are clustered at the sub-plan level. Marginal 
effects are for a unit change in each variable at mean values of remaining variables. In addition to gender, 
age and membership length are measured at end of year, annual balance and salary enter as natural logs. 
Those who are a web-user in any year are denoted by a dummy variable (yes =1). Additionally, gender, 
balance and age are allowed to interact. Dummy variables for member location (state) and year are 
included but not tabulated. Robust residuals are clustered at sub-plan level. Marginal effects are estimated 
at mean values of remaining variables. 




    Z p-value [95% Conf. Interval] 
Male -0.1128 0.0062 -18.28 0.0000 -0.1249 -0.1007 
Age 0.0140 0.0003 -50.51 0.0000 0.0134 0.0145 
Account Balance 0.0931 0.0025 36.77 0.0000 0.0882 0.0981 
Salary 0.1001 0.0055 18.09 0.0000 0.0892 0.1109 
Membership 0.0009 0.0013 0.73 0.4640 -0.0016 0.0035 
Web User 0.3886 0.0065 59.91 0.0000 0.3759 0.4014 
N        975,655      
Wald 2(24), p-value   
36945.08 




Table S.6 Advice Seeking Topics in Individual Years 
This table presents estimations of the likelihood a member sought advice in 2011 classified by the dominant advice topic: 
Administration dominant; Investment dominant; Retirement Planning dominant; Other topics; and Not called (not 
tabulated). The sample is restricted to those who joined a sub-plan before 2011 and remained a member for the full 2011 
calendar year. Prior Administration, Prior Investment, and Prior Retirement Planning are additional indicators (yes=1), to 
those variables included in Table 5, of whether the member had sought advice on that topic prior to 2011.  A multilevel 
mixed effects multinomial logit model is estimated with, in addition to the fixed effects reported, individual random effects 





Error Z p-value 95% Conf. Interval 
 Administration Dominant (11% of dominant classification) 
Male -0.0105 0.0020 -5.20 0.0000 -0.0145 -0.0066 
Balance  0.0138 0.0012 11.37 0.0000 0.0114 0.0161 
Salary  0.0023 0.0022 1.04 0.3000 -0.0021 0.0067 
Membership  -0.0061 0.0005 12.68 0.0000 -0.0071 -0.0052 
Age  -0.0008 0.0001 -6.54 0.0000 -0.0010 -0.0005 
Prior Administration 0.0264 0.0034 7.78 0.0000 0.0198 0.0331 
Prior Investment 0.0018 0.0025 0.70 0.4840 -0.0032 0.0067 
Prior Retirement Planning 0.0108 0.0020 5.28 0.0000 0.0068 0.0148 
 Investment Dominant (9% of dominant classification) 
Male 0.0039 0.0014 2.72 0.0070 0.0011 0.0067 
Balance 0.0001 0.0012 0.05 0.9580 -0.0022 0.0024 
Salary 0.0216 0.0020 10.58 0.0000 0.0176 0.0256 
Membership -0.0007 0.0004 -1.74 0.0810 -0.0015 0.0001 
Age 0.0006 0.0001 8.91 0.0000 0.0004 0.0007 
Prior Administration 0.0077 0.0015 5.23 0.0000 0.0048 0.0106 
Prior Investment 0.0264 0.0017 15.87 0.0000 0.0231 0.0296 
Prior Retirement Planning 0.0059 0.0016 3.61 0.0000 0.0027 0.0091 
 Retirement Planning Dominant (5% of dominant classification) 
Male -0.0003 0.0022 -0.15 0.8820 -0.0046 0.0040 
Balance  0.0021 0.0007 2.99 0.0030 0.0007 0.0035 
Salary  -0.0017 0.0024 -0.68 0.4970 -0.0064 0.0031 
Membership  -0.0010 0.0003 -3.37 0.0010 -0.0016 0.0004 
Age 0.0018 0.0001 25.17 0.0000 0.0017 0.0020 
Prior Administration 0.0068 0.0019 3.51 0.0000 0.0030 0.0105 
Prior Investment 0.0039 0.0021 1.89 0.0580 -0.0001 0.0079 
Prior Retirement Planning 0.0143 0.0017 8.63 0.0000 0.0111 0.0176 
 Other (6% of dominant classification) 
Male -0.0036 0.0014 -2.62 0.0090 -0.0063 -0.0009 
Balance -0.0027 0.0010 -2.84 0.0050 -0.0046 -0.0008 
Salary 0.0055 0.0017 3.18 0.0010 0.0021 0.0089 
Membership -0.0007 0.0003 -2.22 0.0260 -0.0013 0.0001 
Age 0.0006 0.0001 10.19 0.0000 0.0005 0.0007 
Prior Administration 0.0080 0.0022 3.60 0.0000 0.0036 0.0123 
Prior Investment 0.0165 0.0019 8.62 0.0000 0.0127 0.0202 
Prior Retirement Planning 0.0103 0.0014 7.14 0.0000 0.0075 0.0132 
Log pseudo-likelihood  Initial (-96418.85),  Final (-95795.66) 
n 124, 069 
 
 
